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When
the Truth is a Bombshell
Everyone
knew that President Alberto Fujimori had bribed members of
Congress, but only when the reality was seen close up, through
a video transmitted on television, did the Peruvian crisis
explode. For a regime with undeniable secrets, the truth and
the press were its main enemies.
By Ricardo Uceda
The decision by
Alberto Fujimori to abandon power was so surprising that the
best informed man in the country didn't even know: Vladimiro
Montesinois, his closest advisor. Certainly Montesinos had
to be the first one surprised. Otherwise, perhaps Fujimori
could not have made his announcement.
Even from Panama,
where he first sought asylum, Montesinos tried to keep giving
orders. But on September 14, with all his power intact, he
learned that there would be new elections and the National
Intelligence Service (SIN), which he ran, would be dismantled.
When Montesinos
recovered from his surprise, he made common cause with the
Army to again pressure Fujimori. He managed to do so, but
the situation was beyond reversing. Public opinion cried out
its support for new elections. So did the Organization of
American States, despite the fact that after verifying fraud
at the beginning of the year it only planned to help "democratize"
Fujimori's third administration. And the television channels
- which had lain at Fujimori's feet since 1992 - became interested
in their own independence.
As was later proven,
Montesinos and the Army disapproved of Fujimori's decision
to abandon the stage, saving his own skin and leaving the
Army in a position to settle scores. Although the country
was outraged at the transmission of a video showing Montesinos
bribing an opposition parliamentarian, the situation was manageable
by Fujimori's allies. The system could support a crisis. The
Attorney General's office planned to file away the case on
grounds that the presumed bribed congressman, Alberto Kuori,
really was only receiving a personal loan from Montesinos;
Congress would refuse to investigate and television would
find other scandals to distract attention. That would only
leave the immoderate cries of the opposition.
That's what Montesinos thought, according to reliable sources.
This was based on the presumed possibility of putting out
the fire. Montesinos, more than an exceptional analyst, is
a great manipulator of circumstances, and the enormous resources
at his disposal contributed to his fame: Congress, the Public
Ministry, the judicial sector, the Armed Forces, torrents
of illegal funds and an intelligence service that had no limitations.
With this arsenal, plus the major television stations, SIN,
the intelligence service, managed previous crises by fabricating
scenarios in each case. But Fujimori deduced this time that
no maneuver could avoid what he had feared most over the years:
that light would be shed on the darkest parts of his government,
especially the corruption managed from the SIN offices. So
he decided throw in the towel.
The press: the
regime's most feared opponet
Since 1992, when
Fujimori became a dictator upon closing Congress, his main
fight has not been against the opposition, which, despite
its aggressiveness, never became a popular majority that could
defeat him. It was against the independent press, a small
group of media and journalists that was able to make public
what was repulsive about the government. In vain, this sector
was ferociously attacked by the SIN. The most unpopular moments
for Fujimori did not come about because of mass movements,
strikes or parliamentary defeats. They were the result of
investigative reporting. Pure and simple news stories.
The first was produced
by the news magazine Sí, which showed that nine students
and a professor from the Cantuta University were assassinated
by the Colina Group, a military squad protected by the government.
Although the Army put its tanks in the streets, Fujimori -
who had become "democratized," having elected a
constituent congress - could not prevent the start of trials
of the guilty. Channel 2 produced the second big report when
it revealed that the Army had tortured one of its own intelligence
agents, Leonar la Rosa. Later, the newspaper Liberación
proved the existence of Montesinos' millionaire holdings,
evidently illicit. And then came the investigation of El Comercio
and Channel N that proved the inscription of Fujimori as a
candidate in the 2000 elections contained more than a million
falsified signatures.
In all these cases,
the government was able to trample the justice system, allowing
the corruption to continue. To save members of the Colina
Group, an unconstitutional law was passed allowing them a
military trial, where they were given amnesty. Nor was there
any punishment in the Army for those involved in the tortures.
The income of Montesinos was never investigated. The justice
sector preferred to accuse those who had denounced the falsified
signatures.
Against this background
of fraud, the elections of May were held. Despite a harsh
report from the OAS and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate,
Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori insisted in participating in a
runoff election administered by the electoral organizations
he dominated, and on July 28 he proclaimed himself president
for the third time. Two months later, the video blew up in
his face.
In reality, everyone
knew that, after he failed to win a parliamentary majority,
Fujimori had been "buying" support until he had
obtained it. Some congressmen said they had rejected the bribes.
But one thing is to know it and the other is to see it up
close and feel the incomparable images. It wasn't until the
man from SIN was seen handing over 15,000 dollars to Alex
Kuori that the people - a good part of whom thought Fujimori
was a good president associated with a bad person: Montesinos
- withdrew its support. And not just because of what it saw.
Somehow the video showed that there was still much corruption
to be revealed. And that Fujimori was involved up to his neck.
The crisis continues
and one of the high tension cables remains the press. Fearing
the revelation of new truths, the government has conditioned
the elections. Impunity in exchange for democracy. The opposition
rejected this, so there they are, face to face. Both sides
know that the independent press, its influence strengthened
before the public, will play a decisive role.
Ricardo Uceda heads the investigative reporting
team for El Comercio, Lima
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